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I. INTRODUCTION
Dumping generally brings lower prices to the consumers of the
importing country, the benefit of which is dispersed throughout the
economy unless it is outweighed by genuine injury to a domestic indus-
try.' The essential element in the regulation of dumping is, therefore,
the problem of determining when injury is sufficient to justify remedial
action. In the United States, and in many other countries, the stan-
dards for such determination have evolved from the notion that dump-
ing is an example of price discrimination between countries.2 If a
higher price in the exporting country can be traced to monopolistic
control over the domestic market by the exporter,3 then dumping is
more clearly seen as anticompetitive behavior, and the potential injury
to an industry in the importing country may be substantial.4 Accord-
* School of Economics, University of New South Wales.
** George Mason University; Acting Director, Office of Regulatory Policy & Planning, Fed-
eral Maritime Commission.
* Federal Maritime Commission.
Metzger, American Foreign Trade and Investment Policyfor the 1970": The Williams Com-
mission Report, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 537, 557 (1972).
2 See C. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMics 258-79 (1968).
3 Fisher, The Antidumping Law of the United States: A Legal andEconomic Analysis, 5 LAw
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 85, 88 (1973). Import duties and transportation costs may also act as barriers
to the reentry of dumped items.
4 The type of injury here referred to is the type resulting from unfair trading practices.
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ingly, antidumping regulation in the United States has placed consider-
able emphasis on less-than-fair-value pricing, which is a designated
form of unreasonable price discrimination.5
All past significant antidumping regulatory efforts have concerned
merchandise trade rather than trade in non-factor services. Article VI
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and. Trade states:
The contracting parties recognize that dumping, by which products of one
country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than
the normal value of theproducts, is to be condemned if it causes or threat-
ens material injury to an established industry in a territory of the con-
tracting party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic
industry.
Non-factor services have always occupied a special category in interna-
tional trade.7 Import duties have not been applied to non-factor serv-
ices in the same way as they are applied to commodities. More
importantly, services pose a number of technical problems associated
with the diversity of items grouped in that category, and with the diffi-
culty of determining the quantity and fair value of such purchases from
foreign sources.' It is, nevertheless, important to consider allegations
of dumping in connection with non-factor services because the service
industries, in general, form a rapidly growing element in international
trade. In 1975, for example, they constituted about twenty percent of
total world trade,9 and in some regions the ratio between non-factor
services and merchandise trade has already risen to forty percent. 10 A
major concern at the moment is that they are becoming a convenient
target for commercial policies aimed at countering short-term balance
5 The first to appear was the Antidumping Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 801, 39 Stat.
756, 798 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 71-77 (1973)).
6 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. VI, 61 Stat. pt. 5, 11, 58,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 258 (emphasis added).
7 There are five categories of non-factor services: shipping, other transportation, travel, other
private services, and other government services. "Other private services" is the least homogenous
group since it includes labor and property income, not included elsewhere, as well as communica-
tion, advertising, brokerage, management, operational leasing (other than charters), processing
and repairs, merchanting, and professional and technical services. For a more complete discus-
sion, see INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MANUAL (4th ed. 1977).
8 Attempts to impose duties on non-factor services would lead to enforcement problems since
documents are often the only physical entities to cross national boundaries. Though difficulties
are encountered with all ad valorem duties, merchandise trade items can be examined by customs
authorities to ensure that the items have been correctly reported and appropriately valued. The
use of Swiss banking services by United States residents, on the other hand, is extremely difficult
to confirm.
9 Sapir & Lutz, Trade in Non-Factor Services.- Past Trends and Current Issues, WORLD BANK
STAFF WORKING PAPER No. 480, at 2 (1981).
tO Id This dramatic ratio increase has occurred, for example, in Southern Europe.
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of payments difficulties. Protectionism in the trade of non-factor serv-
ices has become an important policy consideration."
Despite rather formidable obstacles to the enforcement of an-
tidumping regulation for services, the basic concepts associated with
the statutes which are currently applied to the merchandise trade are
also relevant to services from state-controlled economies. Certain pro-
cedural modifications are necessary, however, and emphasis should be
placed primarily on genuine injury and secondarily on a finding of
sales at less than fair value. If this change in emphasis were applied
generally, it would entail an alteration in the traditional approach to
antidumping regulation in the United States. While a search for a
more appropriate view of dumping is merited, it is beyond the scope of
this article. The views presented here are associated specifically with
recent cases concerning the ocean freight services of shipping compa-
nies from the Soviet Union. Application of these concepts to other
service industries may require additional modification.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF DUMPING REGULATION
Antidumping procedures, as currently applied, have evolved from
attitudes toward price discrimination, and such attitudes have compli-
cated the enforcement procedures. Jacob Viner noted, in his major
treatise on dumping, that the extensive price discrimination by trusts
and cartels in the United States and in Germany during the early part
of this century elevated the importance of antidumping regulation.' 2
The major rationale at that time was the use of tariffs to promote free
trade by preventing a concentration of market power through preda-
tory pricing policies of large firms. The view still persists today, as it is
frequently argued that an active enforcement of the antidumping law
in the United States is import-limiting, but not protectionist. Thus, a
strict stand against continuous and predatory dumping is consistent
with a free trade policy.'3
Nevertheless, the debate continues over the desired level of strict
enforcement of antidumping laws. There is, both conceptually and
practically, a fine line separating acceptable profit maximizing behav-
ior, which may include price discrimination between markets,' 4 and
unacceptable behavior which causes injury. The antitrust approach
maintains that influences arising from monopolistic control over an
'l Id
12 J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 51-80 (1923).
13 Fisher, supra note 3, at 86.
14 C. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 2, at 19.
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otherwise freely operating market are almost always harmful. Atten-
tion is, therefore, directed towards the anticompetitive aspects of price
discrimination, so that injury is presumed to occur upon a finding that
the pricing practices constitute unfair methods of competition.
The antitrust approach is visible in the early antidumping pro-
ceedings. The Antidumping Act of 1916 made it unlawful for any per-
son to import or sell articles within the United States at a price
substantially less than the actual market value if such acts are done
with the intent of destroying an industry in the United States, and,
thus, have the effect of creating a dependence upon a foreign-based
monopoly or cartel.t5 The necessity of proving intent and the difficulty
in obtaining jurisdiction over foreign suppliers account for the ex-
tremely limited activity under the Act. 16
In 1919, the Tariff Commission issued a report on the Antidump-
ing Act, stating that "economic conditions are more significant in the
development of dumping practices than any particular intent."' 7
Neither the report in its definition of dumping nor the 1921 Antidump-
ing Act as passed by the House required a determination of injury.
The Act, as signed into law,'" included an injury requirement in the
Senate version of the bill, but the Senate Finance Committee declared
that its purpose was to facilitate the administration of the law, not to
restrict its operation.' 9
Under the 1921 Antidumping Act, an administrative determina-
tion as to sales at less than fair value is made by the Commerce Depart-
ment (formerly the Bureau of Customs). 2° If the finding is affirmative,
15 The text of the relevant provision states:
It shall be unlawful for any person importing. . . any articles from any foreign country in to
the United States. . . to import [or] sell. . . such articles within the United States at a price
substantially less than the actual market value or wholesale price of such articles, at the time
of exportation to the United States in principal markets of the country of their production, or
of other foreign countries to which they are commonly exported. . .[if] such acts [are] done
with the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the United States, or of restraining or
monopolizing any part of trade and commerce in such articles in the United States.
Antidumping Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1976).
16 See Kaye & Plaia, The Relationsho of Countervailing Duty andAntidumping Law to Section
337 Jurisdiction of the U.S. International Trade Commission, 2 INT'L TRADE L.J. 1, 43 n. 167
(1977).
17 U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION, INFORMATION CONCERNING DUMPING AND UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA'S ANTIDUMPING LAW 9 (1919).
18 Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, § 201, 42 Stat. 11, amendedby 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976),
repealed by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 106(a), 93 Stat. 144, 193 (adding
subtitle IV to the Tariff Act of 1930 at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77g).
19 S. REP. No. 16, 67th Cong., Ist Sess. 10 (1921).
20 The transfer of responsibility from the Bureau of Customs and the Secretary of the Treas-
ury to the Commerce Department occurred with the passage of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144.
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the matter is referred to the International Trade Commission for the
purpose of considering the question of injury.21 If less-than-fair-value
sales and injury to a domestic industry are proved, the Secretary of
Commerce is required to impose an antidumping duty equal to the dif-
ference between the imported price and the fair value of the product.
There is no requirement for proof of predatory intent and there are no
"excuse" provisions or exceptions as are provided in the Robinson-Pat-
man Act.2 2
In the 1960s, the Commission explicitly applied antitrust standards
by stating that sales at less than fair value are condemned only when
there is an anticompetitive effect, and that only then will such less-
than-fair-value sales be equated with the concept of "unfair competi-
tion."'  Courts upheld the Commissions consideration of intent, even
though not specifically provided for in the statute.24 There are also ref-
erences to antitrust standards in the legislative history of the 1921 An-
tidumping Act and in the administrative procedures associated with it.
In 1974, the Senate Finance Committee expressed a desire for a more
strict enforcement of unfair foreign trade practices, including injurious
price discrimination covered by the 1921 Antidumping Act. The Com-
mittee referred to "indicators" of injury such as the suppression or de-
pression of prices, loss of customers, and penetration of the United
States market.25
Since the administrative determination of less-than-fair-value
pricing precedes the quasi-judicial ruling of injury,26 evidence pertain-
ing to the former can be used in connection with the latter. Specifi-
cally, the refusal of an alleged dumper to raise the price after a
"disclosure" hearing27 is taken as an indication of bad faith and preda-
21 Under the provisions of the Customs Simplification Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-768, 68
Stat. 1136, the injury determination was transferred from the Treasury Department to the Interna-
tional Trade Commission, known then as the Tariff Commission.
22 See Kaye & Plaia, supra note 16, at 44.
23 Id at 50-51.
24 One ruling held that "the statute refers not only to injury but also to the likelihood of
injury, which clearly envisages future events and the probability of their occurrence according to
someone's intent." City Lumber Co. v. United States, 457 F.2d 991, 997 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
25 SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, TRADE ACT OF 1974, S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
179, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7186, 7316 [hereinafter cited as TRADE ACT
OF 1974, S. REP. No. 1298].
26 See supra notes 20 and 21 and accompanying text.
27 An investigation is initiated with the publication of an Antidumping Proceeding Notice.
Within six months or, in more complicated investigations, within nine months after the date of
publication of the Notice, the Secretary is required to publish a Withholding of Appraisement
Notice, a Notice of Tentative Negative Determination, or a Notice of Tentative Discontinuance of
Antidumping Investigation. Normally, the Withholding of Appraisement Notice is issued only
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tory intent.28 Moreover, the Commission has expressed disapproval of
anticompetitive acts such as "confidential contractual relationships, 29
and has established the principle that an injury can be judged upon a
showing that less-than-fair-value imports were a contributing factor,
which has been held to exist merely by showing displacement of some
domestic sales by the imported item.30
The relationship between the 1921 Antidumping Act and other
trade practices legislation has been the subject of recent discussion.31
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 193032 is frequently mentioned as an
alternative remedy for injury arising from the importation of articles
into the United States. Although the Commission has never considered
dumping within the meaning of the Antidumping Act of 1921 as consti-
tuting a basis for action either under Section 337 or its antecedent pro-
vision, Section 316 of the Tariff Act of 1922,33 jurisdiction is arguable
in cases containing mixed allegations where part of the activities com-
plained of are within the purview of one statute and part are within the
purview of the other.34
It has also been suggested that Section 337 is more broadly based,
prohibiting unfair trade practices that have the effect or tendency to
restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States.35
Even if a de minimus injury test 36 is applied in antidumping enforce-
ment, the imposition of an antidumping duty necessarily entails the dif-
ficult problem of calculating price differences based upon market
transactions. Section 337, on the other hand, permits exclusion orders
after a "disclosure" hearing where the general findings of the investigation are revealed and both
parties are requested to submit any additional information they might have.
28 Steel Jacks from Canada, U.S. Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. AA 1921-49, Pub. No. 186 (Aug.
1966), 31 Fed. Reg. 11,197 (1966). In this particular case, antidumping duties were imposed even
though the United States industry had increased its sales of the affected product and shown grow-
ing profits. For commentary, see Fisher, supra note 3, at 110.
29 Steel Reinforcing Bars from Canada, U.S. Tariff Comm'n Inv. No. AA 1921-33, Pub. No.
122 (Mar. 1964), 29 Fed. Reg. 3840 (1964).
30 Opinions on this point are plentiful. See Metzger, supra note 1, at 557; Fisher, supra note 3,
at 104; Marks & Malmgreen, Negotiating Nontarj'Distorlions to Trade, 7 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 327, 379-80 (1975); TRADE ACT OF 1974, S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 25, at 180, reprinted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7317.
31 See Kaye & Plaia, supra note 16; Brandt & Zeitler, Unfair Import Trade Practice Jurisdic-
tion." The Applicability of Section 337 and the Countervailing Duty andAntidumping Laws, 12 LAw
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 95 (1980).
32 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
33 See Kaye & Plaia, supra note 16, at 11.
34 This problem is discussed at length by Brandt & Zeitler, supra note 31.
35 Id at 104.
36 See Fisher, supra note 3, at 104.
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which prohibit entry of the subject articles, 37 and is not limited to only
one industry-market and the transactions associated with it, but is con-
cerned with the overall impact on competition. This overall impact on
competition is held by some observers to be a "far more accurate ba-
rometer of disruptive behavior in the import trade and on competition
in the United States."38
The existence of a parallel development in the two statutes merits
additional comment. In purely conceptual terms, dumping entails no
judgment concerning the anticompetitive nature of the firm's pricing
policies, nor does it necessarily involve a restraint of trade in the im-
porting country. The sale of merchandise in the United States by a
foreign producer at a price which is less than that charged to purchasers
in his home market or in a third country, with a United States industry
injured as a result,39 constitutes aprimafacie argument for market ma-
nipulation. Such actions are particularly onerous if the United States
price does not allow recovery of production and marketing costs since
the producer cannot be maximizing short-run profits. Therefore, in
such cases, dumping implies a potential for long-run gain and the reali-
zation of that potential may be anticompetitive, especially since the
gain is more clearly understood by an eventual elimination of competi-
tors. The purpose of the 1921 Antidumping Act is to prevent that even-
tuality by imposing a duty which, if properly calculated, will be just
enough to allow both the foreign producer and the domestic competitor
to exist in the market. It is not intended to prevent the importation of
products which are produced more cheaply abroad as a result of com-
parative advantage. Actions relevant to the 1921 Antidumping Act,
therefore, do not constitute a restraint of tradeper se, but may do so if
allowed to continue uncontrolled.
Section 337, on the other hand, is more specifically related to un-
fair methods of competition and unfair acts which are anticompetitive
per se. The effect or tendency to destroy or injure substantially an "ef-
ficient and economically operated" United States industry, or to re-
strain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States, is
presumably stronger and more fully developed than the effect or ten-
dency which is considered in antidumping proceedings. An affirmative
finding under Section 337 is, therefore, associated with the more strin-
37 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e) (1976).
38 Brandt & Zeitler, supra note 31, at 105.
39 The definition was reiterated in a Senate staff critique. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FI-
NANCE, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS., TEXT OF ANTIDUMPING ACT, 1921, INTERNATIONAL ANTIDUMP-
ING CODE AND RELATED MATERIALS 56-57 (Comm. Print 1968).
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gent remedy of permanently excluding entry of the products into the
United States. Such an order is more closely aligned with actions judg-
ed to be anticompetitive and associated with irreparable harm.
Although the above distinction is apparently well-defined, the
practical problems of determining whether lower prices of foreign
products are fair or unfair are virtually the same under the two statutes.
For this reason, the standards have acquired over time a considerable
degree of similarity. Recent amendments have tended to reduce the
differences even further. The Trade Act of 1974 broadened the exclu-
sion-of-entry remedy, which was originally intended for unfair acts af-
fecting property rights, such as patent or trademark infringement. 40
The amendment gave the Commission cease and desist order author-
ity,41 and in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Congress included a
provision authorizing a civil penalty as an alternative to exclusion for a
violation of a Commission cease and desist order.42
The development of dumping regulation in the merchandise trade
of the United States is relevant to this discussion of trade in non-factor
services for two reasons. First, either of the two statutes described
above could be extended to include services, but neither would provide
ideal coverage. The procedures in the Antidumping Act pose problems
in determining the differences between domestic and foreign market
prices, and, as is pointed out in the following sections, these problems
are more serious in the case of trade in services with controlled-econ-
omy countries. Additionally, the administration of a duty on services
would be extremely costly. Although Section 337 procedures do not
include customs duties, the more extreme form of the remedy is likely
to result in a preponderance of no-violation findings in order to avoid
the exclusion of services which are slightly different from those avail-
able in the domestic market. Second, the emphasis on antitrust stan-
dards is not easily transferred to investigations of specific activities of
state-owned enterprises, especially when those activities involve serv-
ices rather than standardized products. Nothwithstanding these limita-
tions, the Antidumping Act provides a useful framework for
determining when injury or the threat of injury is sufficiently great to
justify an affirmative finding. The example of the liner activities of the
40 See Brandt & Zeitler, supra note 31, at 98.
41 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(1) (Supp. IV 1980) (added by Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618,
§ 341(a), 88 Stat. 1978, 2053-54 (1975)).
42 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 1105(b), 93 Stat. 144, 311 (codified at
19 U.S.C. § 1337(0(2) (Supp. IV 1980)).
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Soviet Union shows that such a determination becomes relatively more
important when the other major criteria are impractical.
III. DUMPING FROM STATE-CONTROLLED ECONOMIES
Under a central planning system, internal prices are not deter-
mined on the basis of free-market costs, but are established at the com-
mand of pricing commissions. Additionally, state control generally
places a priority on import needs, so that exports are planned accord-
ingly at prices which do not necessarily reflect the resource costs of
producing them. Even if the latter costs are appropriately calculated,
the rate of exchange with another currency is also administered, so that
it may not be an appropriate numeraire for converting these costs into
units of foreign exchange.
The difficulties inherent in valuing products from state-controlled
economies have been recognized by the Department of the Treasury.43
In 1978, sections of the Customs Regulations were amended 44 to pro-
vide procedural assistance in maintaining the Secretary's authority to
determine the foreign market value of merchandise exported from a
state-controlled economy country on the basis of the normal costs, ex-
penses, and profits for the merchandise, as reflected by the prices or the
constructed value of such or similar merchandise from a similarly de-
veloped non-state-controlled economy country or countries.45 The
concept of constructed costs is, therefore, used as a means for valuing
products whose home market is essentially not-comparable.46
There is, unfortunately, a more basic problem. The fair value con-
cept rests firmly on the theory of comparative cost. Ideally, it permits
the regulatory authority to allow imports from countries which have a
comparative cost advantage in that particular commodity, and to disal-
low the importation if such an advantage cannot be demonstrated.
With controlled-economy countries, however, the theory neither ex-
plains what is produced nor what is exported.47 The use of a surrogate
43 The Commerce Department inherited the valuation problems in 1979. See supra note 20.
44 Antidumping Investigation Procedures Under Antidumping Act, 1921, 19 C.F.R. §§ 153.17
and 153.27 (1978) (deleted, 45 Fed. Reg. 75,641 (1980)).
45 This Authority, currently codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (Supp. IV 1980), was originally
granted by the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 321(d), 88 Stat. 1978, 2046-47 (1975)
(adding subsection 205(c) to the Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. § 164(c) (Supp. I 1978)),
which was repealed by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 106(a), 93 Stat.
144, 193, and amended to the Tariff Act of 1930 at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (Supp. IV 1980).
46 See generally Comment, Soviet .loc Dumping, the Revenue Act of 1916 and Economic Pol-
icy, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1365 (1980); Comment, Dumping by State-Controlled-Economy Countries:
The Polish Golf Cart Case and the New Treasury Regulations, 128 U. PENN. L. REv. 217 (1979).
47 One author took as his main task "to show the irrelevancy of the theory of comparative
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country does not alter the failure. Rather, it establishes a pretense of
maintaining a regulatory standard in situations in which the standard
breaks down. It undoubtedly permits a judgment to be made which
might otherwise be impossible, but, in so doing, it casts aside the assur-
ance of maximum welfare associated with the free movement of goods
according to the "law" of comparative advantage.
The increased trade between the United States and state-con-
trolled economies is certain to test the ability of the new criteria to meet
the basic objectives of the 1921 Antidumping Act. The task of selecting
a similar product made and sold in a non-state-controlled economy that
is at a similar state of economic development is far from straightfor-
ward. It has already led to proposed rule changes and revisions of pro-
posals for establishing the criteria associated with "similar states of
development."48 If a "similar state of development" can be identified,
but a similar product cannot, then a constructed value is applied using
normal costs, expenses, and profits that would result if the product were
produced in that "similar" country. If neither type of similarity is
achieved, then prices and costs of any non-state-controlled economy,
including the United States, can be used.49 It would appear, therefore,
that all contingencies are covered, but the process of eliminating insuf-
ficiently similar countries for comparison purposes is time consuming
and open to challenge at each step.50
IV. SOVIET LINER ACTIVITIES
The only service industry discussed at the 1979 United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development meeting in Manila was mari-
time transportation.5 The issue arose from the relatively low partici-
pation in world shipping by developing countries. In 1975, for
example, exports from developing countries accounted for about sixty
percent of world seaborne cargo and imports comprised about twenty
percent of the world total, but those countries owned only six percent of
costs in the centrally planned economies of the Communist type." Wilcznski, The Theory of Com-
parative Costs and Centrally Planned Economies, 75 ECON. J. 63 (1965).
48 One set of regulations established a hierarchy of alternatives for selecting a comparable
market-economy country. Most preferred was the use of price or constructed value from market-
economy countries of comparable economic development-as indicated by, inter alia, per capita
gross national product and infrastructure development. 43 Fed. Reg. 35,265 (1978) (deleted, 45
Fed. Reg. 75,641 (1980)).
49 Note, Dumpingfrom 'Controlled Economy' Countries." The Polish Gojf Cart Case, II LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 777, 782 (1979).
50 For commentary, see id at 798-800.
51 Sapir & Lutz, supra note 9, at 36. See also R. BALDWIN, NON TARIFF DISTORTIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 113-15 (1970).
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the world fleet.12 Moreover, the traditional maritime nations consider a
national merchant marine to be of vital importance for economic and
security reasons, so that a variety of measures exist to protect those
interests. 3 Cargo preference schemes which reserve all or part of a
country's trade for movement in its own vessels, government procure-
ment, special tax treatment in favor of national vessels, and direct sub-
sidies are the more common protective devices. The desire for
increased participation by nonmaritime countries and the increased
support by the governments of existing carriers are developments
which may be repeated in other service industries.
Liner shipping54 is also the only non-factor service for which sub-
stantial dumping allegations have been made, and, in this case, made
specifically with respect to carriers from state-controlled economies.
The Ocean Shipping Act of 197811 gave the Federal Maritime Commis-
sion (FMC)56 authority to disapprove, after notice and hearing, any
rates which the "controlled carrier" failed to demonstrate as just and
reasonable. The Act also provided standards for the determination of
the justness and reasonableness of such rates. These standards will be
explained and contrasted with conventional antidumping statutes later
in this discussion.
To date, the Commission has focused most of its attention on the
Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESCO), a Soviet-owned shipping
company. FESCO, which has traditionally served United States/Asia
trades, increased its market penetration in the 1970s so that by 1978 it
controlled six percent of the United States/East Asia trade.5 7 The rate
of growth was significantly greater than any of the incumbent carriers
52 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Merchant Fleet De-
velopment Statistical Annexes on Cargo Flows, U.N. Doe. TD/222/Supp. 3 (Dec. 1978);
UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport, 1977, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.4/178/Rev. 1 (1979).
53 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (MARITIME ADMINISTRATION), THE MARITIME AIDS OF THE
SIX MAJOR MARITIME NATIONS (1977); DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (MARITIME ADMINISTRA-
TION), MARITIME SUBSIDIES (1978).
54 Liner shipping involves ocean-going vessels which sail according to fixed, advertised sched-
ules and charge rates which are published and cannot be increased for a fixed period (up to ninety
days in the case of United States liner trades). The majority of the world's container trade moves
in liner vessels.
55 Pub. L. 95-483, 92 Stat. 1607 (codified as amendments to the Shipping Act of 1916 at 46
U.S.C. §§ 801, 817 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
56 The Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) regulates all liner trades into and out of United
States ports. 46 U.S.C. § 804 (1975). The authority for such regulation is vested in various ship-
ping statutes, primarily the Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, 38 Stat. 728 (codified as amended in
scattered sections beginning at 46 U.S.C. § 801 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
57 Maritime Administration Trade Route 29. Congress has authorized the creation of neces-
sary "trade routes." See 46 U.S.C. § 1121 (1976).
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had been able to achieve. It was this factor, plus allegations of intense
rate cutting, which encouraged a closer investigation of the FESCO's
pricing policies. The multitude of rates contained in a shipping tariff
and the large number of carriers in most trades mean that a state-con-
trolled carrier may easily weave its rate structure so that it may not
publish the lowest rates on particular commodities, but its overall rates
may be so low that a profit-oriented carrier could not compete
successfully.5
8
The legislative history of the Ocean Shipping Act of 1978 indicates
that the motivation for unreasonably low rates was given considerable
attention. The most convincing economic explanation for dumping
from a socialist economy is the need to obtain hard currency to pay for
high-priority imports from hard-currency nations. If the final selling
price in hard currency produces a greater utility than the opportunity
costs involved in the production of its good or service, then it would be
rational to charge a price in hard currency which was less than soft
currency costs. It is possible, therefore, that dumping from state-con-
trolled economies may persist in the absence of economies of scale.
The latter can be discarded as a probable cause if the products which
they are accused of dumping are in short supply domestically, so that
the economies, if they exist, could be realized by expanding domestic
sales.59
The extent to which a socialist country will export a particular
product or service at prices below domestic soft currency costs in order
to acquire hard currency will depend upon their need for the imports
and the alternative means of earning hard currency. As to the latter,
liner shipping has been one of the Soviet Union's major sources of for-
eign exchange. The potential for earning foreign exchange depends
upon the expenditures abroad for port services and fuel, the extent to
which the vessels have to be acquired from a foreign shipbuilder, and
the risk of operating with less than full utilization of the vessels in for-
eign-to-foreign trades.6" With regard to these considerations, it is not
clear whether liner shipping is superior to alternative sources of foreign
exchange earnings, but it has been suggested that the Soviet Union has
a disadvantage in commodity exports arising from consumer percep-
58 A rate structure is determined by examining the relationships of the numerous rates on
individual commodities-such as automobiles, toys, animal hides, television sets, etc.-the total
revenue associated with the aggregation of these rates and the quantities of each which are trans-
ported during a specified time period.
59 Fisher, supra note 3, at 130.
60 Cohen & Shneerson, The Domestic Resource Costs of Establishing/Expanding a National
Fleet, 3 MAR. STUD. & MrMT. 221 (1976).
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tions of inferior quality. Liner services are generally associated with a
smaller range of quality variation, so that non-price competition is a
less important factor. Most experts agree, however, that non-economic
considerations of national security and prestige have carried considera-
ble weight in the Soviet's decision to expand their merchant fleet.61
V. AN ANALYSIS OF SOVIET PRICING POLICIES
If one of the goals of the state-controlled firm is to acquire hard
currency, then the amount earned must be viewed on a net basis-hard
currency earnings minus hard currency expenditures. For illustrative
purposes, consider the case of two competing firms, one which must
cover all costs of production and one which is only required to cover
hard currency expenditures, such as a state-controlled carrier. Suppose
also that the latter carrier incurs a portion of its expenses in hard cur-
rency, so that its average and marginal cost6" curves can be depicted by
vertical displacements of marginal and average cost curves of the pri-
vately-owned carrier (see figure 1). Assuming, for simplicity, that the
revenue functions are identical for both firms, the state-controlled en-
terprise will expand its output to Q, and charge a lower price, P, than
the privately-owned firm.63 The point is that the controlled carrier can
be expected to offer a lower price and a greater output simply because
part of its costs were "absorbed." The case is, therefore, equivalent to a
direct subsidy, maintained as long as the real value of the net earnings
in hard currency is greater than the opportunity cost of the soft cur-
rency expenditures to produce the service.
Available evidence suggests that the analysis above is a reasonable
description of current pricing considerations of state-controlled-econo-
my firms64 and indicates that socialist firms may be maximizing the real
resource value of their sales, even when selling below fully allocated
costs expressed in soft currency terms. The premium placed on hard
currencies, therefore, creates a situation in which a state-controlled firm
61 Soviet Maritime Activities in the U.S. Liner Trades, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Merchant Marine of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1977); Ocean Shipping Act of 1978, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Merchant Marine of the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
62 This requires that some of the hard currency expenses are associated with variable costs.
63 Profit maximization takes place at the output level where MC = MR, which is point A for
the privately-owned operator and point B for the state-controlled operator. The controlled carrier
will charge a lower rate and operate at an expanded level of output. See Figure 1.
64 I. CHRZANOWSKI, M. KRZYONOWSKI & K. LuKs, SHIPPING ECONOMIES AND POLICY: A
SOCIALIST VIEw 200 (1979); Fisher, supra note 3, at 129; ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED
STATES, THE SOVIET MERCHANT MARINE: ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC CHALLENGE TO THE
WEST 12 (1979).
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can reduce prices in hard currency markets below the aggregate cost of
production and still maximize the real earnings of the state. The inci-
dence of such pricing policies increases with the need to finance the
importation of grain, capital equipment, and advanced technology.
The desire to obtain critical imports has led to policies which determine
import needs first and then encourage exports to obtain the currency
necessary to finance those imports. Exports are viewed as a sacrifice to
obtain those imports deemed necessary to fulfill the general economic
plan.65
The dumping of shipping services to acquire foreign exchange
may be viewed as a logical extension of state-controlled planning to the
services sector.66 The key indicator as to whether the merchant fleet
has fulfilled its plan, and the major factor in determining crew bonuses,
is the percentage relationship between operating expenditures in do-
mestic currency and net foreign exchange income. Soviet shipping
65 Wilcynzski, supra note 47, at 64.
66 For a more complete list of possible explanations for socialist dumping, see Fisher, supra
note 3, at 129-30.
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companies are given an incentive to minimize the ratio of ruble ex-
penditures to foreign exchange earnings. 67 These considerations sug-
gest that Soviet carriers are likely to operate with freight rates which
are lower than those which would normally apply to non-state-con-
trolled carriers.
VI. FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION Two-STAGE TEST
Replacing the theory of comparative costs with one which pro-
vides a better explanation of the pricing behavior of an exporting enter-
prise in a state-controlled economy reduces the level of generality, but
yields a more practical set of principles for specifically applicable cases.
Although the Congress included a constructive cost standard,68 recog-
nition was given to the difficulties in obtaining the desired degree of
similarity. It was noted in particular, with respect to an amendment
proposed by the Department of Justice, that: "In most instances, such
identical operations would not exist, and, therefore, the constructive
cost standard could never be used. The Committee believes that it is
advisable to allow the [Federal Maritime] Commission greater dis-
cretion in selecting comparable vessels for cost comparison
purposes ... 69
For various reasons, the Commission has chosen not to exercise
the constructive cost option. Rather, the standard pertaining to rates
the same or similar to those filed by another carrier in the same or
similar trade70 was the focal point in the analysis prepared by FMC
economists in three proceedings concerning controlled carriers.71 In
67 R. ATHAY, THE ECONOMICS OF SOVIET MERCHANT-SHIPPING POLICY 64 (1971).
68 The Ocean Shipping Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-483, § 3, 92 Stat. 1607, added the follow-
ing language to the Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728:
For the purpose of this subsection, in determining whether rates ... by a controlled
carrier are just and reasonable, the Commission may take into account appropriate factors,
including, but not limited to, whether: (i) the rates ... which have been filed ... are below
a level which is fully compensatory to the controlled carrier based upon that carrier's actual
costs or upon its constructive costs, which are hereby defined as the costs of another carrier,
other than a controlled carrier, operating similar vessels and equipment in the same or a
similar trade; (ii) the rates.. . are the same as or similar to those fied or assessed by other
carriers in the same trade; (iii) the rates. . . are required to assure movement of particular
cargo in the trade; or (iv) the rates. . . are required to maintain acceptable continuity, level,
or quality of common carrier service to or from affected ports.
46 U.S.C. § 817(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). Congress substituted "constructive" for "constructed" cost.
69 S. REP. No. 1260,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3536, 3556; H.R. RP. No. 1381, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9.
70 Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 817(c)(2)(ii) (Supp. IV 1980).
71 Specific Commodity Rates of Far Eastern Shipping Co. in the Philippines/U.S. Pacific
Coast Trade and U.S. Gulf/Australia Trade, F.M.C. Doc. No. 80-6, reprintedin 20 SHIPPING REG.
REP. (P & F) 460 (Oct. 3, 1980); Specific Commodity Rates of Far Eastern Shipping Co. in the
Philippines/U.S. Pacific Trade, F.M.C. Doc. No. 79-104, reprintedin 20 SHIPPING REG. REP. (P &
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Docket No. 79-10, the Commission investigated 305 of FESCO's rates
which appeared unreasonably low. The proceeding covered every ma-
jor trade route served by FESCO, and, consequently, precluded an in-
depth analysis of the circumstances surrounding individual rates. In
two subsequent cases, the Commission narrowed the scope of the inves-
tigations by suspending only eight rates in Docket No. 79-104, and
seven rates in Docket No. 80-6. A major consideration in these latter
two cases was whether the rates charged by the controlled carrier were
inflicting harm on other carriers.
As an example, the Commission ultimately found that FESCO's
rates on buri and rattan furniture moving inbound from the Philippines
were unreasonably low.72 The disapproval of these rates hinged on the
fact that FESCO's rates were considerably below those of the Confer-
ence (The Philippines North America Conference), and that these low
rates were inflicting harm on the Conference and other carriers.73 The
harm issue was determined on the basis that the commodities at issue
were of major importance to the trade (furniture items accounting for
seventy-seven percent of the conference's Pacific Coast cargo), and the
fact that the other carriers' shares had dwindled while FESCO in-
creased its market penetration.74 To assist the Commission in reaching
a final determination, the FMC staff developed a detailed analysis
showing the historical trends and levels of the commodity rates, the
effect of FESCO's service in the trade on those specific commodities as
it impacted on other carriers' market shares, and whether FESCO's
rates were necessary to assure the movement of particular cargo.75
The criteria employed in the impact analysis appear to be evolving
into a two-stage test which includes a demonstration that the controlled
carriers' rates at issue are lower than a carrier selected for comparative
F) 249 (Aug. 5, 1980); Rates of Far Eastern Shipping Co., F.M.C. Doc. No. 79-10, reprinted in 19
SHIPPING REG. REP. (P & F) 1536 (Apr. 1, 1980).
72 Specific Commodity Rates of Far Eastern Shipping Co. in the Phillippines/U.S. Pacific
Trade, F.M.C. Doc. No. 79-104, reprinted in 20 SHIPPING REG. REP. (P & F) 249 (Aug. 5, 1980).
73 Conferences are cartel-like arrangements wherein member companies jointly agree upon
rates. Independent lines normally do not enter into rate-fixing agreements with conference lines.
74 Specific Commodity Rates of Far Eastern Shipping Co. in the Philippines/U.S. Pacific
Coast Trade and U.S. Gulf/Australia Trade, F.M.C. Doc. No. 80-6, reprinted in 20 SHIPPING REG.
REP. (P & F) 460 (Oct. 3, 1980); Specific Commodity Rates of Far Eastern Shipping Co. in the
Phillippines/U.S. Pacific Trade, F.M.C. Doc. No. 79-104, reprinted in 20 SHIPPING REG. REP. (P &
F) 249 (Aug. 5, 1980).
75 Specific Commodity Rates of Far Eastern Shipping Co. in the Philippines/U.S. Pacific
Coast Trade and U.S. Gulf/Australia Trade, F.M.C. Doc. No. 80-6, reprintedin 20 SHIPPING REG.
REP. (P & F) 460 (Oct. 3, 1980); Specific Commodity Rates of Far Eastern Shipping Co. in the
Phillippines/U.S. Pacific Trade, F.M.C. Doc. No. 79-104, reprinted in 20 SHIPPING REG. REP. (P &
F) 249 (Aug. 5, 1980).
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purposes, and that these low rates have inflicted material injury to non-
state-controlled carriers. This approach is similar to the system used in
conventional dumping cases where sales at less than fair value must be
demonstrated and injury to the domestic industry must be documented.
The determination of sales at less than fair value in a service industry
such as liner shipping, however, is more complex than is the case where
merchandise sales are involved. Ocean freight rate structures contain
prices for the transportation of thousands of separate items, whereas
there is normally only one established price for a commodity sold in
international markets. The question, then, is how to determine whether
an individual shipping rate is lower than the fair value when there ex-
ists an array of prices, some much higher than others and some much
lower, even though the overall cost of transport is roughly the same for
each commodity. This price differentiation, based on value-of-service
characteristics, such as the elasticity of demand for the transport of var-
ious products, is a well-established principle in ocean transportation,1 6
but it makes the investigation of fair value difficult.
The coexistence of conference and independent carriers in most
United States trades, while representing less of an analytical problem
than rate differentiation, nevertheless adds a further complication not
present in conventional dumping cases. The usefulness of the actual or
constructive cost 77 criteria is questionable when all carriers establish
some rates at a level above fully allocated costs and other rates below
fully allocated costs. It would be unfair to require a controlled carrier
to have all of its rates equal to or higher than some arbitrarily deter-
mined fully allocated cost level when its competitors were free to estab-
lish a more flexible pricing regime. The only reasonable standard,
therefore, is one predicated upon the comparison of prices of an indi-
vidual non-state-controlled carrier. The question is which non-state-
controlled carrier to select for comparison.
The 1978 amendments to the Customs Regulations,78 previously
mentioned, established the following ranking system for finding a price
to compare with the state-controlled economy firm's price:
(1) Prices of a non-state-controlled economy country in a compa-
rable stage of economic development;
76 B. DEAKIN, SHIPPING CONFERENCES: A STUDY OF THEIR ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT AND
ECONOMIC PRACTICES ch. 5 (1973).
77 Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 817(c)(2)(i) (Supp. IV 1980).
78 Antidumping Investigation Procedures Under Antidumping Act, 1921, 19 C.F.R. §§ 153.17,
153.27 (1978) (deleted, 45 Fed. Reg. 75,641 (1981)).
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(2) Prices of any other non-state-controlled economy country ex-
cept the United States; and
(3) Prices in the United States.
This system did not cover liner shipping, but, even if it had, the
application of a similar ranking system to shipping would have created
difficulties stemming from the unique international characteristics of
liner shipping and the existence of shipping conferences. The interna-
tional characteristics of liner shipping are such that even though a
country might be identified as being at a comparable stage of economic
development, the costs of operating vessels owned by nationals of that
country may not represent economic values attributable to internal
costs in that particular country. It would be possible, for instance, for a
British-owned liner company to register its vessels in Liberia, hire mul-
tinational crews, and employ vessels which were constructed in Ger-
many. The selection of a carrier such as this for use in a rate
comparison analysis would pose great analytical problems if the test
were to be one where the prices used for comparison were those of a
"country in a comparable stage of economic development."
The existence of the conference system in the international ship-
ping industry also complicates the application of existing dumping reg-
ulation to the shipping sector. The amendments to the Antidumping
Act, previously mentioned, rank the selection of a foreign firm's prices
above those of a United States firm. This procedure may not be trans-
ferable to shipping because of the conference system of ratemaking.
Under the conference umbrella, all members can establish similar
prices such that United States and non-United States members would"
have identical prices. Nonconference carriers, on the other hand, nor-
mally establish rates at ten to fifteen percent discounts of the confer-
ence rates. Once again, nonconference carriers can be United States or
foreign-flag operators.
The critical distinction, then, is not whether the prices of the carri-
ers selected for comparison represent those of a firm from a country at
a comparable stage of economic development, but rather whether the
carrier is a nonconference operator.79 Ideally, the nonconference car-
rier selected for comparable purposes should also be one which has
operated in the trade as an independent for a sustained period of time,
thereby demonstrating that it can earn a reasonable rate of return with
79 Conference rates are normally the highest in the trade, so if a state-controlled carrier be-
longed to a conference, it would be virtually impossible to accuse it of dumping. In fact, member-
ship in a conference would automatically exempt the vessels used in the conference trade from the
application of the Ocean Shipping Act of 1978, 46 U.S.C. § 817(c)(6)(iii) (Supp. IV 1980).
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its rate structure. The carrier selected for comparison should be used to
analyze each rate of the state-controlled carrier to avoid the problem of
rate weaving.
In the most recent cases involving formal allegations of dumping
leveled against FESCO,s° the FMC suspended the rates at issue when-
ever they were lower than the rates assessed by the carrier selected for
comparative purposes, if FESCO had penetrated the market for the
commodities whose rates were at issue. In those instances when
FESCO's rates were lower but no cargo moved under the lower rates,
the rates at issue were not suspended.
This two-stage test-first, making a finding that the rates at issue
are lower than those charged by a similar carrier and, second, deter-
mining that market penetration has occurred-is somewhat analogous
to the treatment of dumping allegations in the merchandise trade sec-
tor. Penetration (disruption, in FMC's words) can be interpreted as the
equivalent of the material injury concept used by the International
Trade Commission.
The similarity is, however, somewhat deceptive because the first
stage of the test (identifying an independent carrier which the con-
trolled carrier is underpricing) is not the precise equivalent of a deter-
mination of less-than-fair-value pricing since the costs of providing the
service are not evaluated. More importantly, the Commission appears
to give considerable weight to the existence of any market penetration
(injury) whatsoever. The real test would seem to be one of material
injury, with a finding that the controlled-carrier is pricing below a com-
petitor a necessary step only to suspend a rate which has resulted in the
controlled carrier gaining a share of the market. Put differently, the
controlled carrier must gain its share of the market by any method ex-
cept price cutting for its activity to go unchallenged.
The FMC's dilemma is, of course, that no one, including the most
knowledgeable economist in socialist pricing behavior, could argue
successfully that the controlled carrier's pricing techniques were merely
a reflection of astute management and efficient operations; the exist-
ence of command pricing decisions invalidate any attempt to justify
controlled-economy prices. Lacking certainty that the rate cutting was
justified on bonafide economic grounds, the Commission apparently
80 Specific Commodity Rates of Far Eastern Shipping Co. in the Philippines/U.S. Pacific
Coast Trade and U.S. Gulf/Australia Trade, F.M.C. Doc. No. 80-6, reprinted in 20 SHIPPING REG.
RP. (P & F) 460 (Oct. 3, 1980); Specific Commodity Rates of Far Eastern Shipping Co. in the
Philippines/U.S. Pacific Trade, F.M.C. Doc. No. 79-104, reprintedin 20 SHIPPINrG REG. REp. (P &
F) 249 (Aug. 5, 1980).
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believes the test of reasonableness turns on material injury, and that it
is safer to err on the side of conservatism. It should be noted that re-
cent cases decided by the Commission relied upon an extensive analy-
sis of comparative rate trends, commodity shares, capacity utilization,
and other necessary economic information to arrive at a conclusion as
to whether material injury had taken place.8
The shift of emphasis to a focus on injury appears one of practical-
ity, not necessarily one of desirability. Nonetheless, the question inevi-
tably arises as to why limitations could not be placed on the amount of
tonnage permitted to enter United States ports rather than subject the
carriers to a protracted proceeding in an attempt to uncover pricing
techniques and material injury.82 The advent of controlled-economy
competition in both the non-factor service sector and the merchandise
trade sector may ultimately result in a shift away from the concept of
antidumping duties (rate increases in shipping) as a mechanism to pro-
mote free trade and a shift toward a systematic elimination of competi-
tion as material injury is inflicted upon domestic producers raising the
specter of unfair competition.
VII. CONCLUSION
The growing importance of non-factor services in international
trade is certain to result in an increase in allegations of dumping simi-
lar to those which have arisen in the merchandise trade sector. Con-
comitant with this growth in service sector transactions has been an
increase in relations between state-controlled economy countries and
market-economy countries. These two events have occurred in the
ocean shipping service sector as several state-controlled economy fleets,
predominantly the Soviet Union's, have increased their activity in
United States liner trades during the last decade.
The application of the antidumping statutes to controlled-econ-
omy dumping has resulted in a further shift of emphasis away from the
antitrust approach, which entailed an analysis of price discrimination
with predatory intent, to a material injury test.
The enactment of the Ocean Shipping Act of 1978, which gave the
Federal Maritime Commission authority to suspend unreasonable rates
81 See supra note 71.
82 Limitation of the amount of shipping capacity permitted in United States trades would be
somewhat analogous to the imposition of quotas in the merchandise trade sector. The Commis-
sion lacks authority to impose quotas, but there is precedent for the introduction of legislation
along these lines. The precedent is found in the "escape clause" mechanism is both United States
and international trade legislation. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,
1947, art. XIX(l)(a), 61 Stat., pt. 5, 11, 58, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 258.
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charged by controlled carriers, has ultimately resulted in the FMC de-
veloping a two-stage test of reasonableness which resembles the treat-
ment accorded allegations of dumping of merchandise, wherein both
less-than-fair-value pricing and material injury must be demonstrated
before remedial action is taken.
Primary emphasis, however, has been placed on injury in recent
proceedings before the FMC. This shift in emphasis can be attributed
to the fact that fair pricing concepts do not appear applicable to state-
controlled economy prices. This factor may ultimately result in a shift
of primary emphasis in the analysis and regulation of dumping of con-
trolled-economy merchandise. An increased emphasis on injury may,
in fact, result in a shift throughout the entire international trade sector,
revising the concept of using the antidumping statutes to promote "fair
trade," and resulting in their predominant use as a protective device.
